Soviet Cheating in FIDE competition: Zurich 1953

You are correct.  But the issue is, was it "fair" to replace Flohr with Smyslov, and at the same time, block the Najdorf for Fine substitution?

You are acting as if there was an absolute consensus that Najdorf should have replaced Fine. That wasn't the case, as Winter pointed out. 

Najdorf was a great player, but I think the Chessmetrics ranking should be taken with a pinch of salt. The three strongest events he played in 1948 were:

6-9th in the Interzonal (equal with Ståhlberg)

1-2nd with Ståhlberg in Buenos Aires (no other participants ranked higher than 25th)

4-5th in Mar del Plata far behind Eliskases, Ståhlberg and Medina Garcia

Ståhlberg was #3 at Chessmetrics, he too ahead of Keres, Smyslov, Bronstein etc. I think that had little connection to real playing strength and was more connected to few international events being played during the war.

Euwe was outside the top ten at Chessmetrics when the World Championship was played, and Fine outside the top twenty, so if Chessmetrics ranking could have been used as qualification criteria they would not even be close to be included. Ten Soviets were ranked ahead of Fine.

Najdorf could well have been included without it being in any way unreasonable, as Ståhlberg who scored similar results at the time, but many strong Soviets also missed out. Was for example Bronstein really weaker than Najdorf in 1948? He won the Interzonal that year (with Najdorf in 6-9th) and shared first in consecutive Soviet Championships 1948-49. Also in the upcoming Candidates events he finished far ahead of Najdorf.

Again, the issue was the Soviets engineered the Smyslov for Flohr substitution, and blocked the other.  Simple as that.  They "stacked the deck."

@Jamiedelarosa, once again take a look at who was on FIDE’s board at the time. It wasn’t run by a bunch of Soviets at the time. 

You're making the classic mistake of equating individual results with tournament and match results (something which also Sammy Reshevsky was guilty of on occasion). Najdorf finished a whopping 3 points behind Botvinnik when the latter won at Groningen 1946 (only Euwe was close, half a point behind Botvinnik). Botvinnik drew only three games, he won a total of 13 for a +10 score in a 19 rounder (Najdorf, for his part, struggled to swat away the tail-enders, dropping a considerable number of draws against modest opposition). Similarly, Botvinnik won the Chigorin Memorial in 1947, Pachman finished 7th, 2½ points behind him.

A general point about ChessMetrics and Sonas' figures for the years when the world was separated into insulated enclaves. They didn't play each other, so the fact that Najdorf and Ståhlberg went through the opposition in South America like two combined harvesters doesn't make them the world #2 and #3 in 1948, because they had not played the North Americans more than occasionally, and the Europeans not at all. Ståhlberg hadn't faced Soviet players for something like 12 or 13 years before the 1948 Interzonal, while Najdorf had only crossed swords with them at Groningen, and then it was basically back to South America for another couple of years. This is not said to disrespect the Argentinian or South American chess scene at the, in fact it was very vibrant (and Argentina took numerous medals at the Olympiads in the 1950s), but the Soviet Union it was not.

Yup, there's very little doubt about it. Flohr was behind several of his Soviet compatriots by this time.

The USSR had offered to host half of the match tournament.  That gave them considerable pull with the running of the event.  And in the geopolitical realm that had occupied all of eastern Europe.

Sooo ... the fact that they hosted half the tournament puts the result in doubt? Not only did Botvinnik enjoy a comfortable after lead after round 10 (the end of the Hague stretch), he won all cycles (the first three outright, and the fourth one shared with Smyslov) except for the last one, when he was virtually assured of the title (3½ points ahead of the rest oft the field).

Botvinnik was highly critical of the way the Dutch part of the tournament was scheduled with rest days seemingly thrown in at random , because the uneven number of participants meant that, some of the players would get overly long breaks between games and hence be at a competitive disadvantage (some rounds were played on adjacent days, others four and even five days apart). The Moscow part of the tournament had a much more regular playing schedule (basically a game every other day).

Botvinnik pointed out the issue with the scheduling already before the tournament. Keres, with the bye in round 9, was the one who got it in the neck with no games for a whole week between round 8 and 10. In round 10 he played one of the worst games of his life against Botvinnik and lost in 23 moves.

Were you aware that when the train from the Netherlands to Moscow, carrying Euwe, crossed the USSR border check, Euwe's preparation notes were confiscated, and not returned for many hours?  For the Soviets contingent, Moscow was a considerable "home field advantage."

We must also take into account the speculation the Keres was coerced to throw his first four games to Botvinnik.

The uneven number of competitors could have been corrected by adding Najdorf, or dropping Smyslov (ersatz Flohr).

Copied from another blog I wrote:

According to the Tournament book, written by Euwe (I have the 2013 English translation by Hanon Russell, with a Forward by Hans Ree), Ree related that Euwe's notes were seized by border guards while the players were taking the train from the Netherlands to Moscow.

"A curious incident, not mentioned in [Euwe's original tournament book], but later described by Euwe, happened at the Polish-Russian border, when the players and their entourage were in their way to Moscow for the second part of the tournament.  Soviet customs officials were intrigued by the strange, hieroglyphic-looking notes in Euwe's luggage that, in fact, constituted his opening repertoire.  What should they do?

Making a phone call to Moscow, obviously, where it was decided the notes should be confiscated, checked at leisure in Moscow, and eventually given back....

But Botvinnik intervened and phoned Moscow himself.  After many hours of waiting, it was decided that Euwe could keep his notes, provided he signed a declaration that nothing in it would be detrimental to the Soviet state."

Given that Euwe finished in last place, I'd say he kept is word.

"Given that Euwe finished in last place, I'd say he kept is word"

Euwe started the event in the Netherlands by losing his first four games, and had scored +0-7=3 after ten rounds, losing both his games to Botvinnik. Then he didn't lose any of his remaining games to Botvinnik and scored slightly better results in the Soviet games. So I think suggesting that Euwe threw his games to get his notes back is to take things a bit too far :-)

I made no such suggestion.  I just pointed out Euwe's opening preparation was seized for some time.  Were those notes copied, or reviewed by the Soviet chess authorities, and used to their advantage.  I don't think anyone knows for sure, but the incident is another in a pattern of behavior.

Euwe did score his only win of the event early in the Moscow leg, when he won against Smyslov (who finished second behind Botvinnik). But I think his result was a combination of the Soviets being very strong and Euwe losing a lot in playing strength rather early. He was 46 at the start of the World Championship, that is the same age as Keres when he was 0.5 from winning the Curacao Candidates (or just a year older than Alekhine when he won the 1937 match).

Apart from that win against Smyslov, Euwe scored a horrible +0-13=6 in what may be the by far worst showing ever by such a recently very strong player. And he was very close to become World Champion without playing, before FIDE decided on having a tournament decide it. Maybe better after all than deciding it on Euwe's having held the title more than a decade back.

Keres was not allowed to win the Curaçao Candidates', he had to atone for his collaboration with the Germans during the Second World War.

Euwe was strong, but not that strong. After all Alekhine selected him to play for the World Championship Match as Alekhine considered Euwe too weak to beat him. As far as I understood it was Euwe himself who proposed to transfer World Championship to FIDE. Euwe became FIDE president.

In the 1953 Candidates, Euwe started strong then faded badly. 

Most of the world class players reach their peak in their late 20s to early 30s.  Max Euwe was born in 1901, so at 47 and 52 for the two competitions, was past his prime.

Sure, some exceptional players, like Korchnoi and Lasker had good results later in life, but they are not the rule.

It's one thing to be past your peak, but I think no other players dropped as much as Euwe did at that age around that time. Botvinnik, Najdorf, Keres, Reshevsky, Smyslov, Petrosian, Spassky, Tal, Geller etc all continued to play really well during their 50s. Maybe Flohr is another example of more of an Euwe style development at the time.

Dr. Arpad Elo's 1978 book, "The Rating of Chess Players, Past and Present," looks at the careers of top players over time.  I think my generalizations follow the findings in his work.

Your observations ring true though.  Not to be a Euwe apologist, but many European players suffered due to WW2.